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ESTATE TAXATION
that such power is inherent even in the absence of statute 9 support
the desirability and propriety of denominating all new affirmative
matter in the reply as an amendment to the complaint.
The proposed new rules limit the scope of the problem consider-
ably since a reply is only allowed in response to a counterclaim
denominated as such, or when ordered by the court.2" Thus, unless
the courts hold contrary to the apparent intention of the new rules,
the number of instances when plaintiff may run afoul of North
Carolina restrictions on the reply will be sharply reduced. Noting,
however, that under the new rules, the complaint may contain claims
which are alternative, inconsistent, or unrelated,2 the striking of
the reply as not being defensive seems to find even less justification.
WILLIAM S. GEIMER
Taxation-Reintroduction of the Premium Payment Plan?
In Revenue Ruling 67-4631 the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue has taken the position that when a husband transfers all inci-
dents of ownership of an insurance policy to his wife more than
three years prior to his death, but continues to pay the premiums
until his death, the premiums paid within the -last, three years are
paid in contemplation of death and represent a transfer of an in-
terest in the policy. The interest transferred is measured by the
proportion the amount of premiums so paid bears to the total amount
of premiums paid; therefore, the proportionate value of the in-
surance bought by these premiums is includible in his gross estate
under section 2035.2 Arguably, this ruling is a reintroduction of the.
old "premium payment" plan rejected by Congress in 1954.
In making this ruling, the Commissioner could have taken two
"' Gilliam Furniture Inc. v. Bentwood Inc., 267 N.C. 119, 120, 147 S.E.2d
612, 613 (1966).
" PROPOSED N.C. RuLEs CIv. PROc. 7(a) (1967).
"'PROPOSED N.C. RULES CIV. PROC. 8(e) (1967).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967 IN'T. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035. For example, if A buys an insurance
policy worth one hundred thousand dollars and pays eight thousand dollars
in premiums over a four year period, with six thousand dollars being paid
over the last three years prior to death, the Commissioner would include in
his gross estate three-fourths of the value of the policy or seventy-five
thousand dollars, and not the six thousand paid for the premiums,
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other positions . He might have included the entire proceeds of
the policy in decedent's estate on the theory that the payment of
the last premium kept alive the right to receive the proceeds upon
death. Or he could have included in the taxable estate only the
amount of the premium payments actually made by the decedent
within the three year period. However, the Commissioner chose the
third alternative, ruling that "unlike the unrestricted gift of money,
a premium payment is a gift of insurance protection, a transfer of
an interest in the policy."' 4 The Revenue Ruling's position is contrary
to that in Lamade v. Brownell.5 The two fact situations seem indis-
tinguishable. The court in Lamade holds that where the insured has
absolutely assigned the policy to his wife, having never exercised
any incidents of ownership in the policy, the proceeds are not in-
cludible in his gross estate even though the insured had paid premiums
on it for the two years immediately prior to his death. The court
said that "the payment of premiums on said policy by the decedent
for the two years immediately prior to his death was by way of
gift.",6
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 changed the then existing
law and provided in Section 2042' that the sole test for determining
whether proceeds, not payable to the executor, are includable in the
decedent's estate is whether the decedent retained any of the inci-
dents of ownership in the policy at his death." The congressional
intent was to place life insurance on a par with other property,
which may be given away free from estate tax if not made in con-
templation of death or in violation of the other inter vivos trans-
fer sections. It was felt by the majority of members of the House
Ways and Means Committee that to discriminate against life
insurance was unjustified, in that it should be the nature of the dis-
* Moses, Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts Can Be Attractive Estate
Planning Toot, 18 J. TAXATION 206, 211 (1963).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
'245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965). Cited with approval in United
States v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 12 n.4 (1st Cir. 1966).
6245 F. Supp. at 697.
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042.8 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. 90 (1954). The House Ways
and Means Committee said: "The bill (sec 2042) would make a basic change
by excluding life insurance proceeds from the taxable estate of the insured
unless at his death he possesses 'incidents of ownership' of the policy. Where
the insured gives away the beneficial interest in the policy, but pays the
premiums, the death benefits would no longer be taxed in his estate." Id. at
B 14.
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position rather than the property which determines the testamentary
character of the gift.9
Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code, is not, of course,
the only section under which the proceeds of life insurance can be
included in the gross estate. Section 203510 treats a transfer of
the incidents of ownership within three years of death as being
in contemplation of death. However, the Revenue Ruling applies
where all the incidents of ownership of the policy itself are trans-
ferred more than three years before death. The only question bf
this Revenue Ruling is whether the money used to pay the prem-
iums, admittedly transferred in contemplation of death, represents
more than the actual dollar amount of the premium.
The Commissioner cites several cases in support of his affirma-
tive position. Chase National Bank v. United States" is cited for
the proposition that a "transfer" means more than the passing of
items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee, and
includes the transfer of property procured through expenditures
by the decedent which results in having it pass to another. The
court in this refund case was concerned with plaintiff's argument
that because the proceeds were payable from the insurance company
to the beneficiary, rather than directly from the insured, there was
nothing on which a transfer tax from the insured to the beneficiary
could be imposed. The crux of the argument centers on the word
directly. The court said that "the power to tax the privilege of trans-
fer at death cannot be controlled by the mere choice ... of the par-
ticular methods by which his purpose is effected, so long as he re-
tains control over those benefits."'" This case is distinguishable
from the Revenue Ruling, because it involves a complete transfer
of the policy in which the decedent has no control over the benefits
already transferred. The only property under his control is the
money used to pay the premiums.
' Id. The minority position is also stated in the Reports "But life insurance
is not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in nature. It is de-
signed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its investment features.
Where the insured has paid the premiums on life insurance for the purpose
of adding to what he leaves behind at his death for his beneficiaries, the in-
surance proceeds should certainly be included in his taxable estate." Id.
10 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
11278 U.S. 327 (1929). Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940), is cited for the same proposition.
22 278 U.S. at 338.
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Liebman v. Hassett,3 according to many writers, 14 constitutes
valid authority for the Commissioner's position in the Revenue
Ruling. The case involved an assignment of a policy by the de-
cedent to his wife two years before his death, thus raising a pre-
sumption of a transfer "in contemplation of death." Since the as-
signee had paid the two premiums during the period between as-
signment and death, it was held that the face value of the policy
less the pro rata amount of insurance purchased with the two prem-
iums paid by the assignee was to be included in the gross estate.
In anticipation of the position taken by the Commissioner in this
Revenue Ruling two writers 5 have already explored the differenti-
ating factors between the Liebman situation and the rationale of the
present ruling. The most distinguishable factor is that in Liebman
the policy itself was transferred in contemplation of death. In the
Revenue Ruling the policy and all incidents of ownership were
transferred more than three years before death with only a prem-
ium payment being transferred in contemplation of death. More-
over, it is necessary to consider the word "transfer" as used in
Section 2035, which includes in the gross estate "property [except
real property situated outside of the United States] to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer . . . in contemplation of his death."' 6 The emphasis is on
a transfer of property made during decedent's life, and what is in-
cluded is the value of the property which was the subject of the
inter vivos transfer. "Although the tax is to be measured by the
value of the transferred property as of the date of the donor's
death, this does not mean that, for the purpose of determining what
148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
"See W. WARREN & S. SURY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION
523 (1961 ed.) ; Mannheimer, Wheeler, Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance
By the Insured, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 260 (1954); Moses, Ir-
revocable Life Insurance Truists Can Be Attractive Estate Planning Tool,
18 J. TAXATION 206, 211 (1963); J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U., Spring 1962, 117,
131.
" Brown & Sherman, Payment of Premiums as Tratsfers in Contempla-
tion of Death, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 790 (1962). The authors also point
out that even if there had been no assignment the same portion of the pro-
ceeds would have been excluded. The case was decided under the Revenue
Act of 1926, Sec. 302(g). This section made life insurance, payable to
named beneficiaries, taxable to the extent that it was "taken out" by the de-
cedent. Under T.D. 5032, 36 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 15 (1941), "taken out"
meant the extent decedent paid the premiums.6 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
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property was transferred, the gifts should be regarded as having
been made as of the date of death."'17 It is arguable therefore that
if the decedent owns no part of the policy (having transferred all
incidents of ownership to the assignee more than three years before
death) the value of the gift should be determined by what property
is still under his control, i.e. the money used to pay the premiums.
Reinforcing this argument is the expressed wish of Congress to
eliminate the payment of premium plan in section 2042 of the 1954
Code,' s and the fact that Liebman is a 1943 decision. Whether
Liebman should be considered good authority in a contemplation of
death case, even if it were on "all fours," is questionable in view of
the 1954 changes in section 2042. It seems reasonable to assume
that Congress intended to eliminate the payment of premium test
altogether, considering the expressed purpose of the Committee to
treat insurance like any other property. If decedent transfers in-
come producing property, the taxability of the income depends on
whether the transferor completely divested himself of all interests in
the property, and if he did, the income is not taxable to him. 9
Similarly, the increased value of the policy should not be taxed to him
because he has completely transferred all incidents of ownership.
The recent case of Scott v. Commissioner"° is cited by the Com-
missioner as holding that upon the husband's death, the propor-
tionate part of the proceeds of the policy attributable to his payment
of the premiums is includible in his gross estate. The facts show
that decedent and his wife owned the policies as community property
under California law. The wife predeceased her husband and be-
queathed to her sons her one-half community interest in policies
on his life. After her death, the husband paid premiums on the
policies, and the court held that the proportionate part represented
by his payment of premiums was includible in his estate. 21
McGhee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d CONG. 2d SEss. 90 (1954).
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1964); Jacob Gidwitz, 14 T.C. 1263(1950) af'd, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952); James E. Frizzel, 9 T.C. 979
(1947), aff'd on reconsideration, 11 T.C. 576 (1948), aff'd 177 F.2d 739
(5th Cir. 1949).
20374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
21 The regulations since 1949 have stated that in determining whether or
not a decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in a policy, regard must
be given to the effect of the state or applicable law upon the terms of the
policy. Thus, California property law must be consulted to determine
whether incidents of ownership are possessed in an insurance policy pur-
chased with community funds. See R. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
1968]
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California cases clearly hold that such insurance contracts may be
separate property, community property, or mixed, depending upon
the source of the premium payments. 22 Thus, to the extent of de-
termining whether a policy is community property the premium
payment test is preserved. This is quite different from the Revenue
Ruling in that the question is not the determination of a community
property interest, but whether the transfer involved more than
the actual money given in contemplation of death.
The issue facing the Commissioner involved the basic determina-
tion of exactly what property interest the payment of a premium
represented. As stated by the Supreme Court, the estate tax "ex-
tends to the creation, exercise, acquisition, or relinquishment of any
power or legal privilege which is incident to the ownership of prop-
erty."23 Basic to a transfer is the transmission from one to another
of an interest in property. The interest must be capable of existing
and must be one which is in fact transferred.2 4 If the interest ex-
ists, then a determination of some value on the interest should be
possible. To find the fair market value of a property interest at the
decedent's death the test is to put oneself in the position of a po-
tential purchaser of the interest at that time.2" It is submitted that a
purchaser would give little for the "interest" decedent had in the
policy for the three years prior to death. He had transferred all
incidents of ownership and therefore had no control over the prop-
erty which was in the hands of the recipient.2"
It is hoped that the reasoning of the Lamade case, combined
with the expressed intent of Congress, will be followed when Revenue
Ruling 67-463 is litigated. To find for the Commissioner would be
a reintroduction of the payment of premium test, at least in spirit.
This test was abandoned by Congress in 1954 and should not be
reestablished by judicial interpretation of section 2035. If the result
advocated by the Revenue Ruling is desirable, then section 2035
or section 2042 should be amended by Congress to reflect such a
desire. JAMES M. MILES
TAXATION 1-33 (2d ser. 1938). See also Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264(1938).2 2 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933); Gett-
man v. Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817 (Dist. Ct. 1948).23Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945).
"' Eleanor A. Bradford, 34 T.C. 1059, 1064 (1960).
" United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).2 But see Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965).
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